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Glenn E. Robinson 
DEFENSIVE DEMOCRATIZATION IN JORDAN 
Jordan's political-liberalization program, initiated in 1989, represents the longest sus- 
tained such opening in the Arab world today. During this time, Jordan has held three 
national parliamentary elections, enacted a number of liberalizing laws, removed 
many restrictions on the press, and minimized the role that the security services, or 
mukhdbarit, play in repressing opposition. Moreover, the liberalization program has 
survived a number of severe challenges, including the second Gulf War and the 
subsequent loss of Jordan's major regional trading partner, Iraq; the implementation 
of a difficult domestic austerity program; and the conclusion of a controversial peace 
treaty with Israel. 
Democratization in Jordan has not followed the same path as the recent democratic 
transitions in East Asia, Latin America, and Eastern Europe. By closely examining 
Jordan's program of political liberalization' since 1989, I will argue that the process 
is best understood as a series of pre-emptive measures designed to maintain elite 
privilege in Jordan while limiting the appeal of more fundamental political change. 
The regime has skillfully managed and directed a process that has throughout pro- 
tected the four pillars of power in Jordan: the monarchy and its coterie, the army and 
security services, wealthy business elites, and East Bank tribal leaders. It has simul- 
taneously sought to undermine the only social force legally able to disrupt key re- 
gime policies, the Islamist Muslim Brotherhood, and its political party, the Islamic 
Action Front (IAF). 
In other words, uncertain about its ability to survive a deepening crisis, the regime 
undertook sufficient reform to assure its political longevity, but without altering the 
core structures of power in Jordan. I term this "defensive democratization." The con- 
cept of defensive democratization provides an additional nuance to our understand- 
ing of democratic transitions more generally by focusing attention on pre-emptive 
liberalizing strategies available to rentier states. 
This essay concludes by arguing that the strategy of defensive democratization in 
Jordan may not be able to withstand the likely political volatility in, and Islamiza- 
tion of, Palestinian politics in Jordan. Ironically, what may pose the greatest threat 
to the democratic transition in Jordan is peace, with the sorts of demographic and 
political challenges the 1994 agreement with Israel has unleashed. Indeed, contrary 
to the optimistic forecasts found in many of the recent works on civil society, the 
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end of the Arab-Israeli conflict may well usher in a new era of authoritarianism in 
Jordan-and elsewhere in the Arab world. 
DEFENSIVE DEMOCRATIZATION IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE 
By now it is axiomatic that democracy has multiple independent variables: no single 
causal variable explains all or even most democratic transitions. Broadly stated, there 
are two schools of explanation for democratic transition, each with multiple variants: 
economic and socio-cultural. Although this is not the place for a comprehensive re- 
view of what is among the largest bodies of literature in social science, it is helpful 
to understand what unites the diverse explanations of democracy and thus what is 
different about the concept of defensive democratization. What both economic and 
socio-cultural schools hold in common is that democracy is fundamentally a bottom- 
up process: societal changes lead to changes in state behavior-that is, to democracy. 
The first school holds that economic transformation of one sort or another is the 
greatest predictor of democratic rule. Within this school, there are two major variants. 
The most famous of these arguments holds that democracy is inextricably linked to 
the formation of certain economic classes, principally the bourgeoisie. The classic 
and bluntest formulation of the relationship between economic class and democracy 
was made by Barrington Moore in his magisterial Social Origins of Dictatorship and 
Democracy: "No bourgeoisie, no democracy."2 More recent work has pointed to the 
decisive role the working class has played in modern democratic transitions and to 
the democratic agnosticism of the bourgeoisie.3 
A major variant of this economic argument points not to class formation but to 
general economic modernization as the principal determinant of democratization. Over 
time, capitalist development and a growing GNP will necessarily lead to greater de- 
mands for political inclusion.4 A recent prize-winning book suggests that per capita 
income of between $1,000 and $3,000 has been the threshold of democratization to 
begin.5 Democratization pressures among the East Asian "tigers" are the usual ex- 
amples cited for the argument that economic growth inevitably leads to political 
opening and even democracy. In a variation on this theme, democratization occurs 
in periods of economic bust that follow sustained economic growth. South American 
democratic transition in the 1980s-during a period of economic decline-are used 
as examples of this model.6 
Socio-cultural explanations of the roots of democracy are also frequently employed 
in the literature. Here again, there are a multitude of different arguments, three of 
which will be mentioned here. First, there is the argument linking the creation of 
(usually Protestant) individualism with democracy (as well as with modern capital- 
ism).7 Although such an argument may help explain early European and North Amer- 
ican democracies, it tells us little about contemporary democratic transitions. A more 
recent argument used extensively in the case of Eastern European countries incor- 
porates the communications revolution and suggests that an "international demonstra- 
tion effect"-or a "contagion of democratic ideas," as Lisa Anderson puts it-by 
democratic core countries profoundly affects social thought and behavior in non- 
democratic countries toward democracy.8 
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Finally, academic debate on democratization in recent years has centered on the 
question of "civil society," What constitutes civil society? Where does it come from? 
And what impact does it have on democratic transitions? These are the major ques- 
tions that have been raised in this debate. A vibrant civil society is thought by many 
scholars to be the single greatest determinant not only of democratic transition, but 
of sustainable democracy, as well.9 
The purpose of this necessarily brief overview of the democracy debate is to 
suggest that virtually all scholars agree that some form of transition in society-eco- 
nomic or socio-cultural-is a necessary (if not always sufficient) condition for dem- 
ocratic transition. There is a consensus that states themselves are not the progenitors 
of democracy but, rather, that they respond to changes in society. Both empirically 
and logically, this makes a good deal of sense. It is true that some recent works have 
concentrated on the art of making a democratic pact between state actors and societal 
actors (and the sorts of combinations of "hard-liner" and "soft-liner" actors that spur 
or inhibit democratization).10 Even in these works on democratic "crafting," how- 
ever, some societal crisis or transformation has pushed the state into accepting the 
need for democratic transition in order to "spread the blame." 
The small handful of scholarly works that take seriously state crisis as the primary 
mover behind democratization invariably invoke the loss of cohesion among state 
elites as the point of departure. In these works, factions of the state elite lose con- 
fidence in the prevailing order and seek to re-legitimate their positions through 
democratization. The origins of such elite conflict-or "fissures in the power bloc," 
as Adam Przeworski puts it1 1-are often left unexplained. Defensive democratiza- 
tion, conversely, need not involve elite conflict, and in the case of Jordan, it did not. 
In this case, there were no fissures in the power bloc, as state elites remained cohe- 
sive throughout. 
The concept of defensive democratization departs from the themes noted earlier in 
that it posits that a state seeks to pre-empt anticipated pressure for political reform 
in the face of a crisis in the state, not society. That crisis is normally fiscal in content, 
as is the case in Jordan. Defensive democratization can take place in the absence of 
class restructuring, economic growth (or growth and decline), a vibrant civil society, 
or any other societal phenomena. Defensive democratization, even in the absence of 
democratizing social pressure, is a state strategy to maintain the dominant political 
order in the face of severe state fiscal crisis. Such fiscal crises, particularly in rentier 
states, are only loosely related to general economic problems in a country. 
Defensive democratization played out in Jordan, briefly, as follows. Jordan, as is 
common in the Arab world, was a "rentier" or "distributive" state in that it relied on 
international rents instead of direct taxation for a disproportionate share of its gov- 
ernment revenues.12 Most of Jordan's rents came from direct state-to-state transfers, 
particularly from Arab oil countries. These rents dried up in the 1980s, leading to a 
severe budgetary crisis in the Jordanian state.13 Jordan then secretly turned to the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) to ease its fiscal crisis, but had to cut public 
expenditures-subsidies-as part of the deal. The resulting unrest in 1989 prompted 
King Hussein to adopt a policy of defensive democratization: to return Jordan to 
limited parliamentary life in order to pre-empt potentially more severe threats to the 
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ruling order. State-driven defensive democratization preserved the basic (although 
somewhat reshuffled) structure of power in Jordan, which might otherwise be threat- 
ened by society-driven substantive reform.14 
Defensive democratization is not without risk for the ruling elite. It is quite pos- 
sible that sustained top-down and limited democratization may gather a life of its 
own, leading to a snowballing of democratic demands. It is a process that may not 
be controllable forever by the elite. However, rentier states are better situated to 
resist demands for significant democratic expansion if the fiscal crisis is limited in 
scope and time. Societal depolitization is a hallmark of rentier states. Conversely, if 
a rentier state is compelled by budgetary realities to permanently extract greater 
resources from its own society (i.e., through taxation), then demands for greater in- 
clusion and substantive political restructuring would be difficult to resist. 
The most important reason that snowballing has not occurred thus far in Jordan is 
that the business community has benefited from the limited nature of the democra- 
tization campaign. The reticence of business to embrace a more extensive democratic 
transition is easily understood: the private sector-dominated by the Palestinian 
community-has benefited the most from IMF structural adjustment in Jordan. The 
private sector needs the protection of the state to prevent East Bank retaliation in the 
form of re-distributing resources toward the East Bank-dominated public sector. In 
this case, ethnic and public/private sector cleavages reinforce each other, leading the 
business community to champion economic, but not political, liberalization. The "exit 
option" for business to split with the state and embrace substantive democratization 
is structurally limited as a result.15 While the particular circumstances in Jordan are 
unique, this mutually beneficial relationship between rentier states and their respec- 
tive business communities appears to be quite common, explaining in part the lack 
of significant democratization in most such cases. 
THE ORIGINS OF JORDAN'S DEMOCRATIZATION PROGRAM 
By almost any measure, Jordan's economic fortunes were in decline well before the 
beginning of the Gulf War in 1990.16 Its per capita GNP, hovering around $2,000 
since 1985, plummeted to less than $1,500 in 1989. Similarly, remittances from Jor- 
danians working abroad, primarily in the Gulf, dropped sharply, from more than $1 
billion annually before 1987 to $623 million in 1989. The Gulf War forced remit- 
tances lower: to $500 million in 1990 and $450 million in 1991.17 During this same 
period, Jordan was running constant deficits in trade and current accounts, and had 
declining real earnings. 
More important (at least to the argument contained here), government transfers, 
primarily from Gulf Arab countries, declined markedly, leading to constant budget 
deficits during this period.18 From 1980 to 1989, Jordan received annually from $550 
million to $1.3 billion in official transfers. In 1990, that figure dropped to $393 mil- 
lion. By 1991, it was down to $164 million. In fact, in 1990 Jordan had to reschedule 
its large external debt because pledges of Gulf financial support had not been kept.19 
In short, in the late 1980s, Jordan was faced with a severe and destabilizing debt 
crisis, which would only get worse in the years that followed. 
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In response to this ongoing and severe fiscal crisis, the government entered into 
an initially secret structural-adjustment agreement with the IMF at the end of 1988. 
In return for IMF loans, Jordan had to undertake a series of economic reforms, in- 
cluding cuts in government spending (primarily subsidies) and increases in govern- 
ment revenues-that is, tax hikes. Subsidies and other types of welfare payments had 
long been staples of Hashemite patronage to important constituencies, primarily in 
the southern (non-Palestinian) half of the country. By cutting these subsidies, and 
thereby indirectly attacking key bases of its support, the monarchy put its very sur- 
vival in jeopardy. The public announcement of the IMF agreement, which included 
sharp increases in the prices of a number of basic commodities, led to bloody riots 
in the south, initially centered on Macan, in April 1989. The riots and ensuing clashes 
between two cornerstones of Hashemite rule-the East Bank-dominated military and 
southern East Bank and Bedouin citizens-shook the regime. Unlike in 1970, Pal- 
estinians were not central players in the unrest. Responding to the most serious 
challenge to his rule in nearly twenty years, King Hussein called for parliamentary 
elections to be held before the end of the year. General parliamentary elections had 
not been held in Jordan since before the 1967 war. 
At one level, Jordan's decision to liberalize fits into arguments found in the civil- 
society literature dealing with rentier states.20 That is, government revenues in Jor- 
dan had come disproportionately from external rents, primarily government aid. In 
turn, the regime distributed these rents to key constituencies as patronage, often in 
the form of subsidies and employment. When the fiscal crisis hit-increasing debt 
and decreasing revenues-the regime had to rid itself of some of its rentier attributes 
by decreasing patronage distribution and increasing domestic extraction (i.e., taxes). 
By relying more on its citizenry than on external rents for its government revenues, 
Jordan was simultaneously compelled to incorporate a greater public voice in decision- 
making. That voice, in turn, came in the form of a democratic opening. 
Such an accounting is true as far as it goes. However, such an explanation needs 
to be tempered by the insights provided by the concept of defensive democratization. 
For example, the political liberalization that was initiated in 1989 has been a top- 
down process designed to maintain basic power relations in Jordan, not to signifi- 
cantly change them. Both the rentier (or, in this case, "post-rentier") and civil-society 
literatures suggest that regimes in crisis are compelled to liberalize in the face of do- 
mestic pressure, and that the liberalization process cannot be easily managed by such 
weakened regimes. In the case of Jordan, however, the democratization program has 
been directed from the beginning by the regime, and should be seen as a means of 
strengthening the regime's position in society, not as an example of the regime yield- 
ing to domestic forces. 
Moreover, while there were clearly pressures from below for change, there was no 
significant grass-roots movement for democracy, per se. The riots were primarily 
about higher prices for basic commodities, not the right to vote. To the degree that 
there were political messages included in this bottom-up pressure, those messages 
were about ending corruption and about renewing the special relationship between 
the Hashemite monarchy and the East Bank/Bedouin communities, a relationship that 
was perceived to be weakening. Structural adjustment has been seen by East Bankers 
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as primarily benefiting Palestinians, who dominate the private sector, at the expense 
of East Bankers, who are found disproportionately in the public sector. 
THE FIRST STEPS, 1989-93 
The 1989 Parliamentary Elections 
In the aftermath of the riots, King Hussein called for new parliamentary elections. 
The 1989 campaign was filled with a number of oddities. First, political parties were 
not yet legal, so candidates ran on individual platforms. Of course, the ideological 
tendencies of candidates were widely known and often publicized by the candidates 
themselves. In addition, the structure of the voting districts for the more important 
lower house was unusual. There were twenty electoral districts, each electing any- 
where from two to nine representatives, for a total of eighty seats.21 Sixty-eight seats 
were reserved for Arab Muslim candidates, nine for Christians, two for Circassians, 
and one to be contested by Circassian and Chechen candidates. Moreover, the official 
campaign period was extremely brief-just twenty-five days. While enthusiasm for 
the election was high, the turnout was disappointing. Only 54 percent of registered 
voters (41 percent of potential voters) cast ballots.22 The entire election was con- 
ducted while martial law was still in effect. 
The suddenness of the decision to hold elections after such a long interregnum, the 
brief duration of the permitted campaign period, and the prohibition of political par- 
ties greatly benefited previously organized groups. As a result, candidates associated 
with the long-standing Muslim Brotherhood and those representing tribal groups were 
particularly successful. Twenty of the twenty-six candidates that the Muslim Broth- 
erhood (unofficially) ran won office. In addition, twelve independent Islamist candi- 
dates likewise won seats.23 Thus, of sixty-eight realistically potential seats, Islamist 
candidates won thirty-two, or nearly half. Various tribal representatives and centrists 
won thirty-five seats, and leftists took the remaining thirteen seats. 
Even though an Islamic bloc won a plurality of the seats, it spent most of its four- 
year term outside of government. Over the objections of the Islamists, the first ses- 
sion of parliament elected the centrist Sulayman 'Arar as speaker. A coalition of cen- 
trists, traditional conservatives, and leftists banded together to shut out the Muslim 
Brotherhood candidate. Again over the objections of the Muslim Brotherhood, the 
king appointed Mudar Badran, former head of general intelligence, as prime minister. 
While Badran negotiated with the Muslim Brotherhood over possible appointments, no 
deal was struck, although three independent Islamists were included in the cabinet. 
The second session was only slightly more successful for the Islamists, who had 
by then organized more formally in Parliament as the National Islamic Bloc. Parlia- 
ment opened in November 1990 in the shadow of the Gulf War, and the Islamists 
were able to elect a speaker from the Muslim Brotherhood, the American-educated 
CAbd al-Latif 'Arabiyat. In a cabinet shuffle, Badran included four Muslim Brother- 
hood deputies, splitting the Islamists. The great appeal for the Islamists in joining 
Badran's cabinet was the promise of the Ministry of Education portfolio. Not long 
after joining the government, the Brotherhood declared that it would segregate the 
sexes in all schools. In response, the king dissolved the government. 
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In June 1991, King Hussein appointed a prominent Palestinian, Tahir al-Masri, as 
prime minister over the objections of the Muslim Brotherhood. In the face of grow- 
ing Brotherhood opposition-centered in part on Jordan's (and Masri's) willingness 
to attend, with Israel, what became known as the Madrid Conference held in Octo- 
ber 1991-the king threatened to delay opening the third session of Parliament. The 
Brotherhood then backed down. In any case, Masri could not long function with a 
minority government and had to step aside when he could not carry a vote of confi- 
dence. The king's cousin, Zayd ibn Shakir was then appointed prime minister. 
While the Islamist plurality came to Parliament confident in its ability to steer 
society toward its world view, its agenda was routinely stifled. In a number of cases 
the Islamists were simply out-maneuvered in Parliament by other parties, as when 
they were unable to get their candidate elected as first speaker. The pattern of the 
Muslim Brotherhood raising issues or objections, only to be beaten back in some 
manner, continued both under Prime Minister Zayd ibn Shakir and his successor, 
CAbd al-Salam al-Majali. On a number of issues, including the segregation of sexes 
in schools, the prohibition of alcohol, and opposition to the peace talks with Israel, 
the position of the Muslim Brotherhood was simply defeated outright. This was true 
even though the Islamists retained the speaker's position after 1990. 
In fact, while there were numerous and significant political and legal developments 
during the 1989-93 period, the monarchy and the government were largely respon- 
sible for them, not the Parliament. Perhaps Parliament's most important early job was 
to give its blessing to the IMF structural-adjustment program-an ironic task, given 
that the austerity measures had caused the 1989 riots that had brought Parliament 
into being. The other legislative achievements during this period-the Political Par- 
ties Law, the Press and Publications Law, and the successful push for the lifting of 
martial law-could not have occurred without the support of the monarchy. In other 
words, the Parliament could act only within the political parameters set by the king 
and enforced by his chosen prime minister. Any moves beyond those parameters, es- 
pecially those which could threaten elite privilege, were quickly quashed. Parliament 
had little real power to substantially change policies or course. In the end, Parlia- 
ment's primary task was to legitimate King Hussein's political agenda. 
The National Charter (al-Mithaq al-Watani al-Urdunni) 
In the wake of the events of 1989-the riots and the subsequent sudden resumption 
of parliamentary life-King Hussein appointed a sixty-member commission to draft 
a charter outlining the goals and parameters of Jordan's democratization efforts. It is 
ironic that the governing document for Jordan's democratization was drafted a year 
after the first post-riots Parliament (and eleventh overall) had been elected and seated. 
The National Charter was submitted in December 1990 and was subsequently en- 
dorsed by the king in June 1991. 
The charter itself is interesting on several grounds. First, it is a remarkably pro- 
gressive document, repeatedly emphasizing democratic rights, intellectual pluralism, 
tolerance, and equality. In several places, in fact, it stresses equal rights and equality 
before the law of men and women. Second, it explicitly affirms private-property 
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rights, a major pillar of elite power. Third, it shows a healthy schizophrenia, seeking 
legitimacy for its principles at various levels: particularist nationalism (i.e., Jordanian 
nationalism, or wataniyya), Arab nationalism (qawmiyya), Islam (as both religion 
and civilization), and international or universal standards. Fourth, while the short 
history it gives of Jordan is understandably self-serving, it is remarkably frank in its 
admission that the public had lost confidence in state institutions. The charter also 
accurately notes the non-fulfillment of Gulf states' financial pledges to Jordan, which 
worsened the fiscal crisis. 
What is most important about the National Charter is not the progressive senti- 
ments expressed in its pages. The world is full of liberal but unimplemented consti- 
tutions, declarations, and laws, and the Middle East is certainly no exception to this 
pattern. Rather, what gave the National Charter status was its collection of signato- 
ries. The sixty-member committee that drafted the charter consisted not only of well- 
known government and business figures close to the king but also of a number of 
prominent figures from leftist parties and the Muslim Brotherhood. Those signatories 
with close ties to the king included Ahmad 'Ubaydat (a former prime minister), 
'Adnan Abu 'Awda (the king's political adviser), CAbd al-Salam al-Majali (a former 
prime minister), Tahir al-Masri (a Palestinian and former prime minister and foreign 
minister), Ibrahim Badran (a former minister from an important family), and 'Isam 
Muhammad 'Ali Budayr (an industrialist). The participation of such individuals in 
this endeavor is not surprising. 
Leading members of the Muslim Brotherhood also participated in drafting and 
signing the charter. They included Ishaq al-Farhan (the current head of the Brother- 
hood's political party, the Islamic Action Front), Yusuf al-CAzim, 'Abdallah al- 
'Uqayli, 'Abd al-Latif cArabiyyat (speaker of Parliament, 1990-93), Majid Khalifa, 
and Ahmad Qutaysh al-'Azayida. In addition, several independent Islamists were 
members, including Muhammad al-'Alawina and Mahmud al-Sharif (chief editor of 
the newspaper al-Dustur). 
Finally, a number of leftists and Pan-Arabists, often of Palestinian origin with 
strong pro-Palestinian views, also participated in the writing of the charter. These 
included Sulayman al-Hadidi (Bacthist, former Lawyers Association president), Amin 
Shuqayr (Bacthist), Muna Amin Shuqayr (journalist, Bacthist), Dhib Marji (PFLP), 
'Isa Madanat (Jordanian Communist Party), Labib Qamhawi, Asma Khadir, Taysir 
al-Zibri (PFLP), and Hammada Faracina (DFLP). Interestingly, CAli Abu Nuwwar 
also was a signatory. Abu Nuwwar was a leading member of the Free Officers group, 
which staged an abortive coup against the king in 1958. He spent much of his life 
in exile in Egypt after the coup attempt, only to be pardoned by the king and made 
an ambassador. Abu Nuwwar died not long after the elections. 
Codifying the National Charter: The Political Parties Law and the 
Press and Publications Law 
While the National Charter laid the foundation for Jordan's political liberalization 
and had significant political status, it remained a document without formal legal stand- 
ing. Although the charter called for the establishment of political parties-then out- 
lawed-it remained for the prime minister and Parliament to pass this principle into 
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law. This was done in September 1992. Moreover, while the press was permitted 
substantially more practical freedom after 1989, it remained officially controlled and 
censored by the government, a state of affairs in contradiction to any democrati- 
zation. In response, the government and Parliament eased a number of restrictions 
on the media-while simultaneously adding new constraints-with the enactment in 
April 1993 of the Press and Publications Law. 
The legalization of political parties in 1992 corrected the anomaly of the partyless 
1989 elections. For the first time in decades, Jordan allowed public formation of ex- 
plicit political parties. Prior to this time, only the Muslim Brotherhood was tolerated 
as a semi-legal party, although it remained technically a charitable and social orga- 
nization. In any case, the limited public political life prior to 1989 would have made 
political parties superfluous. 
The 1992 law had two interesting features. First, it expressly forbade any party 
from having financial or organizational ties to any outside body (Article 21). This 
provision hinders not only Pan-Arabist parties such as the two Bacthist parties, but 
could be used to shut down virtually any party with Palestinian ties.24 In particular, 
the Muslim Brotherhood in Jordan is-at least, arguably, until recently-the same 
organization as the Muslim Brotherhood in the West Bank (but not Gaza). They had 
merged following Jordan's annexation of the West Bank, and remained so tied even 
after the 1967 war and the loss of the West Bank. If the king ever needed legal 
justification for "legally" closing down the Islamic Action Front, the political party 
of the Muslim Brotherhood, Article 21 would provide it. The same goes for other 
Palestinian-oriented parties-those with ties to the PFLP or DFLP, for example. 
Second, the law laid the groundwork for the potential future "choice" by Pales- 
tinians in Jordan of Jordanian or Palestinian citizenship. If the West Bank/Gaza pol- 
ity is ever able to offer formal citizenship to Palestinians, it is likely that Jordan will 
compel Palestinians living in the kingdom to choose explicitly between maintaining 
Jordanian citizenship or claiming legal Palestinian citizenship with resident privi- 
leges in Jordan. Those who opt for Palestinian citizenship with Jordanian residency 
likely will be excluded from participating in political life in Jordan by Article 5, 
which forbids party members from claiming a non-Jordanian nationality or seeking 
foreign protection (himaya). There have already been calls by East Bankers in Jor- 
dan to "repatriate" Palestinians or otherwise remove them from public life. 
In a sign of things to come, the first party legalized under the new law was the 
Jordan National Alliance, which, in the words of the prominent journalist Lamis An- 
doni, was little more than "a coalition of central and southern Bedouin tribes with 
no economic, political, or ideological program."25 By the time of the 1993 elections, 
twenty political parties had registered. 
The Press and Publications Law has also been central to the liberalization process, 
although not always for the right reasons. Jordan's press had become significantly 
more open after the adoption of the National Charter, which had called for freedom 
of the press. Early drafts of the law embodied those freedoms and reflected the grow- 
ing reality of a free press in Jordan. However, against the recommendation of its own 
legal committee, the conservative Parliament-dominated by the Muslim Brother- 
hood and tribal elements-adopted Article 40 of the Press and Publications Law, in 
effect gutting the very press freedoms the law was supposed to guarantee. It made 
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illegal any news items that offends the king or the royal family; insults Arab, Islamic 
or "friendly" heads of state, or accredited diplomats in Jordan; is contrary to pub- 
lic morals; may offend the dignity of any individual or damage his reputation, or 
offends the armed forces or security organs. Moreover, any foreign publication that 
violated any of these (and other) provisions would similarly be banned from entering 
Jordan. More recently, the government has sought to restrict the press by requiring 
significant financial resources for any paper to operate, effectively eliminating all 
small newspapers. 
Among the remaining large newspapers, there remained a second, more subtle 
form of censorship in Jordan. Through shares owned by the Social Security Fund and 
Jordanian Investment Company, the government owned 60 percent of al-RdCi, 35 
percent of al-Dustiir, and 75 percent of Sawt al-Shacb, by far the largest newspapers 
in Jordan.26 Thus, the government still had the controlling interest on the boards of 
directors, which can dismiss and appoint new editors. The subsequent pressure on 
editors to practice self-censorship in order to stay within defined parameters in their 
reporting was obvious, and was not particularly conducive to a genuinely free press. 
As one editor said, he had "to know how to play the balancing game."27 Government 
influence could clearly be seen in the plethora of positive news stories surrounding 
the peace negotiations with Israel in 1994 (an event not enthusiastically welcomed 
by most Jordanians) and the virtual absence of negative stories.28 
Perhaps the most notable case in which Article 40 provisions were used to intim- 
idate the press was the trial of George Hawatmeh, the editor of the English-language 
Jordan Times, and one of his reporters. Reporting on the Mu'ta trials of military 
cadets charged with conspiracy to overthrow the government and assassinate the 
king, the Jordan Times quoted a defendant who claimed he had been tortured in 
prison. The Jordan Times had carried quotes from the prosecutor for months, with- 
out incident. However, quoting a defendant who claimed-accurately, according to 
a number of other sources-to have been tortured propelled the government to take 
Hawatmeh and his writer to court, with a six-month prison term awaiting them if 
found guilty of "offending the security services."29 While this type of activity chills 
press freedom, it was a clear improvement on the earlier situation. In the past, the 
government could have shut down the Times without explanation; now, it had to 
prove its case in court. 
What was perhaps more interesting than the continued restrictions on the press was 
the easy accommodation many editors made with those restrictions. Where one would 
perhaps expect such editors to be pushing the limits of the press freedoms, some in 
fact were quick to defend the restrictions. For example, the editor of al-Dustuir, Musa 
Kilani, described the press as going though a "teething stage" where the press was get- 
ting used to its new role and the government was getting used to the press. He rejected 
the notion that the monarchy was a legitimate target of criticism, saying only "the 
government and some of its policies" were fair targets.30 Similarly, Usama al-Sharif, 
editor of the weekly Star, accepted that Jordan could not afford "Western press stan- 
dards" because of its social divisions. Such reporting might "create a civil war the 
next day." Continuing the life-cycle metaphor used by Kilani, Sharif suggested that 
the Jordanian press was not "developed enough to handle" real freedom.31 
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One could interpret the press's timidity as many Jordanians did: that press free- 
dom was new and needed to be nurtured, and that over time the press would grow 
into the role it must play in any democracy. One can also accept the political fra- 
gility of the Jordanian polity. This is, after all, a country which had a violent civil 
war in 1970-71, and those divisions-always present-may well politicize again with 
the settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict. The skirmishes over the press, however, 
seemed to be located entirely among Jordan's elite. Indeed, there has been no obvi- 
ous grass-roots movement for a free press. Within this elite there have been clear 
differences of opinion as to what role the press should play during the liberalization 
period. However, there has been elite consensus both inside and outside the press 
that the media should not play an antagonistic role vis-a-vis the monarchy and the 
dominant power relations in Jordan. 
The 1993 Elections 
Although the Parliament elected in 1989 had little power to effect change in Jordan, 
its large contingent of opposition figures, primarily from the Muslim Brotherhood, 
acted as a relatively vocal watchdog of government policy. Given the rapid devel- 
opments in 1993 in the Arab-Israeli talks and the remaining features of the IMF 
austerity package still to be implemented, even this level of opposition was viewed 
as detrimental by the government. As a result, the monarchy and the government 
initiated a process through which a more friendly 12th Parliament would be elected 
in the November 1993 elections. Their actions were largely successful, as the results 
of the elections demonstrated. 
The single most important step in the attempt to engineer a more docile Parliament 
was the adoption of the "one-person, one-vote" system. In the prior election, each 
citizen could vote for as many candidates as there were seats in the electoral district. 
Since districts ranged in size from two to nine seats, each voter in Jordan had 
between two and nine votes to distribute among candidates in that district. It was 
widely believed that the impact of this system in the 1989 elections was the elec- 
tion of more "ideological" candidates-Islamists and leftists-as people could cast 
their "first" vote for a clan member and then cast their "second" vote on ideological 
grounds. Thus, each voter could satisfy both familial and ideological impulses. Mak- 
ing voters choose between these was rightly seen by the government to favor tribal 
gatherings at the expense of political parties. 
Compounding the change in the electoral law was the retention of the twenty elec- 
toral districts. The districts system already was widely seen to favor southern and 
central tribal areas at the expense of far more densely populated (and Palestinian) 
areas, particularly the Amman-Zarqa region. As the secretary-general of the Islamic 
Action Front, Ishaq al-Farhan, argued, the new hybrid system meant voters would 
have unequal votes: in districts electing nine representatives, a voter effectively had 
one-ninth of a vote, while in districts electing two members of parliament, each voter 
had half of a vote; the "weight" of the vote given the second voter would be four and 
a half times that of the first voter.32 Even those in government widely acknowledge 
that the change was principally aimed at undercutting the Muslim Brotherhood.33 
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As talk of the impending electoral change mounted in the summer of 1993, the 
Islamic Action Front began voicing its strong opposition, as did other parties. Of the 
twenty newly registered political parties, sixteen came out against a one-person, one- 
vote system if implemented without concomitant changes in the electoral districts. 
On 4 August, however, the king dissolved Parliament while scheduling the next elec- 
tion on 8 November. Thirteen days later, the government announced its decision to 
adopt the one-person electoral change without any changes in districting. The im- 
mediate and vocal opposition to this change, including calls for boycotting the elec- 
tion, was quickly stunted by the king's forceful acceptance of the electoral changes. 
No party, not least the Muslim Brotherhood, wanted to take on the monarchy. By 
28 August, the IAF announced it would participate in the election. All other parties 
followed suit. 
The election itself was put in jeopardy by the Israeli-PLO accords signed on 13 
September 1993, followed the next day by the signing of the Jordan-Israel Agenda 
(which set the stage for the formal peace treaty signed between Jordan and Israel in 
October 1994). Even the king publicly raised concerns as to whether it was the 
appropriate time to hold elections. However, the decision to go forward was made at 
the end of September, giving the parties little more than a month to prepare for the 
elections. 
The government's election-engineering provided the anticipated results-that is, 
electing what came to be known as the "tribal parliament."34 Islamists lost the most 
seats, going from thirty-two to twenty-two representatives.35 Of those twenty-two, 
sixteen were IAF candidates and six were independent Islamists (and two of those 
were members of the Muslim Brotherhood). No other party won more than five seats. 
In fact, official party candidates won only thirty-four of the eighty seats, with the rest 
won by independents. Indeed, party lists constituted only 10 percent of all candidates 
(55 of the 534). Thirty-six of the fifty-five party candidates came from the IAF. An 
additional forty-five candidates were party members who ran as independents. Even 
when these are added to the total, less than 19 percent of the candidates running for 
Parliament were from political parties. Most of the independents were clan candi- 
dates running clearly on familial bases. In all, fifty-six of the eighty parliamentarians 
were solidly pro-Hashemite, falling under categories of "conservatives" (34), "cen- 
trists" (13), and East Bank nationalists (9).36 The left, virtually extinct in Jordan, won 
only two seats.37 
The election itself was not without problems. First, the turnout was once again 
disappointing, considering this was the first multi-party national election in Jordan 
in decades: 56 percent of registered voters and 45 percent of eligible voters partic- 
ipated. However, 68 percent of registered voters had collected "voting cards" ahead 
of time (which are presented at the voting precinct on election day in order to verify 
voting eligibility). Since voting cards do not have to be collected by the individual 
voter, they were often picked up by clan members or even candidates themselves as 
a "service" to their constituents. Presumably only the people whose votes were as- 
sured were provided this service. Finally, there were numerous reports of the abuse 
of the voting mechanism for illiterates. Illiterates orally dictate their votes to a pre- 
cinct worker, who then marks the ballot. Those people who had sold their votes had 
Defensive Democratization in Jordan 399 
to pretend to be illiterate at the voting booth so that they could loudly call out the 
name of the candidate for whom they were voting. 
None of this should suggest that the election was a sham. It was, in fact, relatively 
free and fair, with abuses not noticeably different from those in many democratic 
elections elsewhere. What was true was that the voting system was successfully en- 
gineered to elect a certain type of Parliament. The one-person, one-vote electoral 
change; the maintenance of electoral districts which favor central and southern tribal 
areas; and the voting card system all worked to elect a heavily tribal, pro-Hashemite 
Parliament.38 No party was immune to playing the tribal card. Even the IAF-the 
only real party in Jordan-often selected candidates based on clan membership. In 
Karak, for example, the powerful Majali clan had nominated its chosen representa- 
tive-the brother of the prime minister-to run for Parliament. The IAF then tried 
to split the clan vote by nominating two candidates to run from that district, both 
from the Majali clan. 
The election results were often characterized in the West as a sign of the de- 
clining relevance of the Islamist movement. This is a misreading of what happened. 
In fact, what needs to be explained is not the decline of the Islamists, but how they 
did so well in an electoral system clearly designed to work against their interests. 
After all, the Islamic bloc won more than a quarter of all parliamentary seats and a 
third of all non-quota seats (the twelve set-aside seats for Christians, Circassians, 
and Chechens were retained). Three factors help explain the Islamists' success. First, 
the Muslim Brotherhood-and by extension, the IAF-remained the best-organized 
non-governmental grass-roots institution in Jordan. Much of the Brotherhood's ap- 
peal rested on its provision of social services in places where the government had 
little such presence. The Muslim Brotherhood ran a number of clinics, schools, and 
other social services throughout the country, but primarily in Zarqa and eastern 
Amman-poor, heavily populated, and largely Palestinian areas. Such organization 
allowed the Muslim Brotherhood to mobilize support in ways other parties could not 
match. 
Second, in comparison with the pervasive image of Jordanian politicians (as else- 
where) as corrupt, self-serving individuals, Islamist candidates often were seen as 
pious, selfless, and incorruptible. The candidates themselves helped this image along 
by wrapping themselves in the banner of Islam. Voters in both the 1989 and 1993 
elections implicitly were asked to choose between the religious and the irreligious, 
even though all the candidates contesting these seats were by law Muslim (excluding 
the minority quota seats). 
Third, and most interesting, the success of the Muslim Brotherhood was intimately 
linked-and in complex ways-to the Palestinian issue. The IAF did best in heavily 
Palestinian areas. In Zarqa, a densely populated, poor, and overwhelmingly Pales- 
tinian city, the top three vote-getters, by a substantial margin, were IAF candidates. 
Of all the votes cast for the winning candidates, 85 percent were for IAF candidates. 
Similarly, in Amman's second electoral district, which included the sprawling Wih- 
dat refugee camp, the IAF received 43 percent of all votes and 78 percent of ballots 
cast for winning candidates. None of this should suggest a heavy Palestinian turn- 
out for the elections. In fact, the best estimate was that only 30 percent of all actual 
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voters were Palestinian, in a country where Palestinian demographic weight is prob- 
ably double that number.39 Similarly, in both Zarqa and Amman's second district, 
turnout was very low-only 18.6 percent of eligible voters in the latter case. Rather, 
the IAF's success in Palestinian areas suggests strong Palestinian support in the midst 
of general Palestinian electoral apathy. 
Palestinians' electoral timidity is easily understood. They have never been fully 
embraced by the Jordanian polity. Further, the surge of East Bank chauvinism fol- 
lowing the disclosure of the secret Oslo negotiations and subsequent signing of the 
Declaration of Principles-after decades of PLO insistence on no separate deals with 
Israel-further alienated Palestinians from the 1993 elections. In fact, the elections 
came at a time of a profound existential crisis in the Palestinian community. Not only 
were they generally alienated from Jordanian politics, but most felt betrayed by the 
PLO for signing an agreement with Israel that ignored the rights of the Palestinian 
diaspora community in Jordan and elsewhere. As a result, the Palestinians who did 
vote tended to vote for the IAF-which had condemned the Oslo Accords-or, in the 
case of Baqca, for independent candidates running on local issues and needs. 
However, the relationship between the Muslim Brotherhood and the Palestinian 
community is more complex than is suggested by their shared opposition to the Oslo 
Accords. The Muslim Brotherhood has been the only organization in Jordan that 
Palestinian activists can join and work for a political agenda while at the same time 
avoiding the label "Palestinian." Unlike any other Jordanian organization, the Mus- 
lim Brotherhood and the IAF have had numerous Palestinians in the upper echelons 
of leadership, yet these individuals generally have not been known politically in Jor- 
dan as Palestinians. They are known primarily as members of the Brotherhood. Non- 
Islamist Palestinian politicians always carry the "Palestian" ethnic tag no matter how 
many governments they serve in, as the case of Tahir al-Masri suggests. 
A cursory glance at the leadership of the IAF shows how deeply Palestinians are 
involved in the movement. At the time of the 1993 elections (before a split developed 
within the IAF), the secretary-general of the IAF, Ishaq al-Farhan, was of Palestinian 
origin (born in 'Ayn Karim, near Jerusalem), as were about one-third of the members 
of both the Executive Bureau and the 120-person Shura Council of the IAF. Perhaps 
most telling of all, half of the 1993-97 IAF parliamentarians (8 of 16) were Pales- 
tinian. The entire eighty-member Parliament has only six other Palestinians, one of 
whom is an independent member from the Muslim Brotherhood. In spite of such 
strong Palestinian involvement, the IAF has not generally been viewed in Jordan as 
a vehicle for Palestinian interests, nor have Palestinian parliamentarians from the 
Islamic bloc been particularly known for their ethnic identity. 
Thus, in addition to its obvious ideological characteristics, the Muslim Brotherhood 
is the only party in Jordan that effectively integrates Palestinian interests without the 
political baggage of Palestinian ethnicity. No other organization that overtly espouses 
a Palestinian nationalist agenda and that is seen to be a legitimate political player 
in Jordanian affairs by East Bankers exists (or has existed) in Jordan. The Muslim 
Brotherhood, then, has carried with it a legitimacy in the eyes of East Bankers-even 
those who oppose its agenda-that an overtly Palestinian party never could. The 
Brotherhood's discreet Palestinian agenda has been seen not only in its electoral and 
social bases, but also in its outspoken opposition to both the PLO's and Jordan's set- 
Defensive Democratization in Jordan 401 
tlement with Israel. Mirroring the alliance in Palestine between Hamas and PFLP, the 
Muslim Brotherhood has informally joined forces with leftist parties (which are seen 
to be openly Palestinian) to oppose normalization with Israel. 
While the Palestinian element in the Muslim Brotherhood is strong, it is not yet the 
dominant force within the organization. East Bankers, sometimes from prominent 
families in Jordan, thus far retain decisive (if weakening) leadership within the 
Brotherhood. The combination of a powerful Palestinian presence in the Brother- 
hood and the maintenance of that organization's leadership by more traditional East 
Bank personalities carries with it the possibility of fissure. In fact, the beginnings of 
such a split may have already occurred with the departure from the IAF of a num- 
ber of hard-liners, some of whom are Palestinian. In any case, it would be political 
suicide for Palestinian Islamists to set up political shop outside the confines of the 
Muslim Brotherhood, as their influence in Jordan would surely ebb. 
For its part, the Muslim Brotherhood rejects what it views as an unimportant dis- 
tinction between Jordanian and Palestinian ethnicity. Rather, the organization accepts 
the unity of the Islamic umma, or community, as its organizing principle. In fact, 
when asked about the disproportionate Palestinian involvement in the Islamic move- 
ment in Jordan, Ishaq al-Farhan-himself a Palestinian-replied, perhaps disingen- 
uously, that "we have never asked this question amongst ourselves; there has never 
been any discussion of this."40 Farhan's comments aside, the question is now begin- 
ning to be raised. 
CONTAINING THE ISLAMIST MOVEMENT 
As was noted earlier, the Islamist movement in Jordan historically has been perhaps 
the most integrated, establishment-oriented Islamist movement in the Middle East. 
First legalized by King 'Abdallah, the Muslim Brotherhood was the only tolerated 
public political grouping in Jordan for decades; even in the long interregnum of mar- 
tial law, the Brotherhood remained politically active, often through its disproportion- 
ate representation in the Ministry of Education. The Brotherhood had long been the 
regime's counterweight to more feared leftist and Nasserist groups, in addition to 
more radical fundamentalist groups, such as the Islamic Liberation Party (Hizb al- 
Tahrir al-Islami). Moreover, the leadership of the Muslim Brotherhood has tended 
to come from well-established political families in Jordan, hardly revolutionary 
elements. For example, the three-term speaker of Parliament from the Brotherhood, 
'Abd al-Litif 'Arabiyat, comes from a prominent Salti clan.41 
In spite of the relatively compliant nature of Jordan's Islamist movement, the re- 
gime has taken significant steps-legal and illegal-to contain and even undermine 
the Islamist movement during the democratization process. Indeed, one of the con- 
sequences of political liberalization has been the significant weakening of the tradi- 
tionally strong relations between the monarch and the Brotherhood. 
Weakening the Brotherhood was not done because the Islamist movement repre- 
sents a threat to the survival of the regime. Rather, the Islamist movement has been 
the only significant power in Jordan that has strongly opposed the two most sig- 
nificant policies driving the democratization campaign: the IMF-mandated austerity 
measures (including the initiation of a sales tax) and the normalization of relations 
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with Israel. Although it has supported political liberalization, the Muslim Brother- 
hood has not supported its defining features; only the Islamist movement could have 
conceivably defeated or seriously weakened these policies. Thus, while the inclusion 
of the Islamist movement in the liberalization process has been politically necessary, 
the monarchy and government have consistently acted to contain the movement's 
power. 
The legal steps taken to weaken the Islamist movements during the democratiza- 
tion period have been described. The most important measure was the change in 
voting rules, which favored clan instead of party candidates. In addition, the pre- 
liberalization electoral districts favored the central and southern rural areas at the 
expense of the cities (especially the Amman-Zarqa metropolis) where the Muslim 
Brotherhood is strongest. 
The regime, or parts of it, also engaged in dirty tricks against Islamists who were 
threatening-entirely legally-one of the foundations of elite privilege: institution- 
alized corruption. The case of Layth al-Shubaylat is suggestive of the limits to ac- 
tual change during the democratization process. Shubaylat, an independent Islamist 
and leading engineer in Jordan, was elected to Parliament in 1989 with the largest 
percentage of votes of any candidate running. Moreover, he won in Amman's third 
district, the most affluent district in the country, by merging Islamist and younger 
secular constituencies in his anti-corruption campaign. Once in Parliament, Shubay- 
lat led investigations into corruption, particularly under the prior prime minister, 
Zayd al-Rifai. While Shubaylat's work led to only one actual indictment, he came 
within a single vote of obtaining the super-majority necessary to indict Rifai himself 
on corruption charges. More important, the hearings exposed routine corrupt prac- 
tices at the highest levels of government by officials eager to translate their political 
power into financial gain. Kickbacks to politicians for various business deals were 
shown to be commonplace. 
Shubaylat's work did not win him many friends within the overlapping political 
and economic establishments. Nor did his vocal criticism of the Muslim Brother- 
hood's "appeasement" of the regime go over well in a number of Islamist circles.42 
However, he remained popular at the grass-roots level and also hails from a promi- 
nent East Bank family, so could not be easily dismissed by the regime. 
By pushing the limits of democratization, Shubaylat was attacking the power 
structure in Jordan. As long as elections could be suitably manipulated, the press 
contained within recognized limits, and Parliament held ineffectual by its lack of real 
power, democratization would not be seen as threatening to elite interests. By ex- 
posing and challenging the ways in which business was done by representatives of 
the political class in Jordan, Shubaylat-and others-threatened to make the democ- 
ratization process a harbinger of structural change. 
As a result, Shubaylat and his fellow deputy Yacqub Qarrash were arrested in 
August 1992 on trumped-up charges, the most serious of which was attempting to 
overthrow the government. Various weapons and explosives were said to be found 
in Shubaylat's possession, and he was accused of being paid by Iran to foment in- 
stability in Jordan. The evidence against Shubaylat was almost certainly fabricated, 
and the charges politically motivated. The trial was held in a military court, a system 
which does not share the reputation for relative independence that Jordan's civilian 
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judiciary does. The trial engendered a great deal of skepticism over Shubaylat's guilt 
in Jordan: no real evidence was produced; most witnesses were inmates suspected of 
making deals for reduced sentences; and the prosecution's star witness immediately 
renounced his own testimony, saying it had been coerced by Jordan's security per- 
sonnel.43 Nevertheless, Shubaylat and Qarrash were sentenced to death, which was 
then immediately commuted to twenty years in prison. Within forty eight hours, the 
king pardoned the two parliamentarians as part of a general amnesty, provoking fur- 
ther speculation that the trial's outcome had been "planned in advance."44 The show 
trial of Shubaylat and Qarrash was a clear warning to Jordanians-and to the Islamist 
movement in particular-that democratization has its limits. 
Such episodes spurred debate within the Islamist movement over the nature of its 
relationship to the government; these debates, in turn, highlighted a larger division 
within the Islamist movement between social Islamists and political Islamists. As I 
have argued elsewhere, the profiles and agendas of these two trends are relatively 
distinct.45 Social Islamists are often East Bankers, are more likely to have had for- 
mal religious training, tend to push for changes centering primarily on social issues 
(such as banning alcohol from the kingdom and segregating the sexes at schools), 
generally support Hashemite rule, and urge close relations with the crown. The op- 
position by social Islamists to the Jordan-Israel peace treaty is based more on fears 
of Israeli cultural and economic penetration of Jordan, and subsequent "assaults on 
Islam," than on issues of political and social justice in Palestine. Social Islamists 
have dominated decision-making in the Muslim Brotherhood for years. 
Conversely, political Islamists in Jordan tend to be more interested in larger po- 
litical issues-not the separation of the sexes-and use a discourse often associated 
with the left: Western and Zionist imperialism, social justice, regime corruption, un- 
equal distribution of wealth, and the like. Political Islamists are disproportionately 
Palestinian in origin and are often independent in political affiliation. Virtually none 
are members of the ulama; rather, they tend to be college-educated in technical 
fields, often, like Shubaylat, in engineering. Political Islamists are much more likely 
to be critical of the regime, and are often critical of the Muslim Brotherhood's close 
relationship with it. 
The split between social and political Islamists over the proper relationship with 
the government has been the basis for several recent watershed developments within 
the Islamist movement. During the early 1980s 'Abdallah 'Azzam and Shaykh Khal- 
ifa-both members of the executive council of the Muslim Brotherhood at the time- 
fought for the leadership of the Brotherhood over precisely this issue. 'Azzam, perhaps 
influenced by Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini's arguments about the illegitimacy of 
monarchy in Islam, was openly critical of the regime in Jordan, while Khalifa ac- 
cepted Hashemite authority. Khalifa ultimately prevailed with help, it is widely be- 
lieved, from the government, and 'Azzam left to fight in Afghanistan. 'Azzam became 
a very popular member of the Mujaheddin, but was ultimately killed by a car bomb 
in Peshawar, Pakistan.46 Among more radical Islamists in Jordan, 'Azzam has become 
a martyr-hero figure. 
The Islamic Action Front has also experienced factionalism in its ranks based, at 
root, on the same issue. Following its licensing, the IAF held elections in December 
1992 for its governing Shura Council. These interim one-year positions were won 
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decisively by IAF hawks, or political Islamists, prompting the departure from the 
IAF of a number of dissenting social Islamists. A year later, in December 1993, 
Shura Council elections were held again, this time for four-year positions. Pro- 
Hashemite IAF officials won decisively. Many observers believe that the government 
played a role in this election similar to that in the CAzzam-Khalifa dispute a decade 
earlier. In response, many of the hawks denounced the elections, and a number left 
the party, including Ziyad Abu Ghanima, a well-known political Islamist in the IAF. 
More recently, splits in the IAF are beginning to appear along the Palestinian-East 
Bank cleavage. This was most evident in the lead-up to the November 1997 parlia- 
mentary elections. The IAF (at the behest of the Muslim Brotherhood), as well as a 
number of smaller nationalist and leftist parties, boycotted the 1997 elections pri- 
marily to protest the continuing application of the electoral law, which they viewed 
as discriminatory against urban parties, to the benefit of bedouin tribes. The boycott 
polarized political life in Jordan between those who felt that participation in the elec- 
tion was necessary and those who supported the boycott. Within the IAF, a similar 
division emerged, and it was primarily along Palestinian-East Bank lines. Palestin- 
ian leaders generally supported the boycott, while East Bankers as a whole wanted 
to participate in the elections. In the end, six Islamists who broke ranks with IAF 
were elected to Parliament, including two prominent members of the Muslim Broth- 
erhood. The most important defector was the IAF parliamentarian CAbdallah al- 
cUqayli. Moreover, CUqayli appears to be on the verge of creating a new Islamist 
party that would more readily participate in government and would likely try to re- 
verse what is seen as waning East Bank control over the Islamist movement.47 He 
complains that Palestinians are taking over the leadership of the Islamist movement 
and distancing the movement from the "Jordanian agenda."48 As expected, the boy- 
cott resulted both in lower voter turnout (especially in heavily Palestinian districts49) 
and in a more heavily tribalized-and unrepresentative-Parliament. 
The earlier co-optation of the Muslim Brotherhood by the regime for the benefit 
of both gave way during liberalization to a more strained relationship. However, as 
the earlier examples suggest, the government has been relatively successful in con- 
taining the Islamist movement in Jordan through coercion and, more importantly, by 
shaping both the structure of political participation and the internal dynamics of the 
movement itself. However, it is less clear that such containment can continue to be 
effective in the coming years because of the movement's persistent strength and its 
large Palestinian presence in a period of volatile identity politics. What such potential 
domestic volatility as a result of the settlement with Israel does suggest, however, is 
that the limited democratization cannot be deepened without threatening established 
elite interests. 
CAN DEMOCRACY AND PEACE CO-EXIST? 
As has been made clear, Jordan's modest steps toward political liberalization were 
taken in order to limit the possibility of uncontrollable change, and were designed to 
protect established interests during an uncertain period. The process was undertaken 
initially by the monarchy as a pre-emptive strike to insure its political survival. In 
subsequent years, liberalization was expanded only in ways that did not threaten 
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(and often helped along) major economic and political objectives of the regime, es- 
pecially the IMF-mandated austerity plan due to run to 1999 and the settlement with 
Israel. Democratization, in effect, has been a continuation of state policies by other 
means. When democratization has threatened elite privileges, even in a legal manner 
(e.g., the Shubaylat corruption hearings), non-democratic means have been used to 
quash those challenges. Perhaps the best measure of the limited nature of Jordan's 
democratization is that the most powerful groups in Jordan prior to 1989 remain so 
today: the monarchy and its coterie, the army and security services,50 wealthy busi- 
ness elites, and East Bank tribal leaders. 
That is not to suggest that nothing has changed. Democratization has made the 
press freer and political association easier; most important, it has also diminished the 
role of the mukhdbardt. The confiscation of passports to silence opposition members 
has virtually stopped, and passports have been returned. Arbitrary arrest and torture 
in Jordan-which have always occurred at rates lower than those of its neighbors- 
are now rare. An indigenous Amnesty International office is even in place. Thus, 
political life in Jordan is the freest it has been since the 1950s. In addition, liberal- 
ization has produced greater public participation in the shaping of policy. For ex- 
ample, the revenue-generating aspects of the austerity package were altered through 
public debate.51 Public resistance to a modest increase in public-school fees in 1994 
forced that decision to be put off.52 
Nor is the centrality of the protection of elite privilege during democratization a 
priori problematic. Guillermo O'Donnell and Philippe Schmitter note that the main- 
tenance of elite privilege has been the cornerstone of "all previously known transi- 
tions to political democracy." For them, measures that threaten elite property rights 
or military prerogative will likely doom the entire democratic transition.53 Thus, it 
can be argued that for Jordan's democratization to have any chance of deepening, it 
must make clear that the interests of dominant elites-civilian and military-will be 
protected. 
Jordan's peace treaty with Israel may well prove to be the undoing of the country's 
democratization program. The two years that followed the treaty-signing were tu- 
multuous for Jordan, highlighting its increased political vulnerability. Surprised by 
the level of opposition that the peace treaty generated, the government began to pla- 
cate key constituencies almost immediately. Custom duties on cars and luxury goods 
were slashed; salaries for schoolteachers (the largest single group of public employ- 
ees) increased; and the army and security services were promised new weapons sys- 
tems and a general modernization of forces (with American help).54 In December 
1994, Deputy Prime Minister Thuqan Hindawi resigned, citing "the cabinet's inabil- 
ity to cope with the aftermath of the peace treaty."55 A week later, Ahmad 'Ubaydat, 
a former prime minister and head of intelligence, was asked to resign from the upper 
house of Parliament because of his opposition to the terms of the treaty and his out- 
spoken criticism of the Majali government's measures to limit dissent. Tahir al-Masri, 
another quintessential "establishment" politician, withdrew from his campaign to be 
re-elected speaker of Parliament due to the turmoil of post-peace Jordanian politics. 
In the midst of this disarray, Prime Minister Majali and his government resigned, 
replaced by Zayd ibn Shakir and a new government in January 1995. That the king 
turned to Ibn Shakir was not surprising, as the new prime minister was considered 
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both experienced and personally loyal: experienced, because this was Ibn Shakir's 
third appointment as prime minister in six years; loyal, because Ibn Shakir, like the 
king, hails from the Hashemite clan. Still, in little more than two years following the 
treaty with Israel, Jordan went through four prime ministers. 
The regime's tolerance of opposition, especially from the Islamist camp, declined 
significantly after the treaty. Reflecting the king's own hardening line against the 
Islamist (and other) opposition, Ibn Shakir denied the Islamists a seat on his thirty- 
one-member cabinet, the only significant political current in Jordan that he excluded. 
He also retained Salama Hammad as minister of the interior, a man known for his 
hard-line policies against opponents of the regime, especially Islamists. Signaling its 
impatience with the widespread criticism of the peace treaty and the pace of normal- 
ization, the regime-including more direct intervention by the king in day-to-day 
affairs-responded forcefully. Its measures included banning opposition rallies, ar- 
resting a number of Islamists, firing unsupportive Muslim preachers from their 
mosque positions, and stripping Islamists of state resources that they had previously 
enjoyed.56 Shubaylat, a leading critic of normalization with Israel, once again landed 
in jail for seven months during 1996. The government's heavy-handed approach was 
noted by a number of human-rights organizations, which reported that violations of 
civil rights in Jordan increased significantly following the treaty.57 The hard-liners on 
the cabinet had an even freer hand after a leading dove, Ibrahim Izz al-Din, resigned 
his cabinet position in the summer of 1995. 
Nor did Jordan's peace partner make the task of selling normalization any easier. 
In May 1995-at the very moment that Jordan's government was sponsoring a per- 
sonal tour of Petra for Yitzhak Rabin, then the Israeli prime minister-Israel an- 
nounced another round of land confiscations in East Jerusalem. This move infuriated 
Jordan, where even the normally pliant Parliament and leaders of some of the most 
important-and loyal-East Bank tribes voiced dissent against continuing normal- 
ization under such circumstances.58 The seemingly endless provocations by Israeli 
Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu after his election in 1996 compelled King Hus- 
sein to write a stinging personal letter to Netanyahu in early 1997 accusing him of 
seeking to destroy the peace and everything that went with it.59 
Even the rebounding Jordanian economy-among the fastest-growing in the Mid- 
dle East since 1994-provided little political relief. In August 1996, a new round of 
riots in southern Jordan was precipitated by the (IMF-mandated) removal of subsi- 
dies for bread, more than doubling its price overnight. A few months later, Amman 
witnessed one of its largest protests ever as thousands of Jordanians tried to stop 
Israel's first trade fair in Jordan, only to be stopped by police water cannons.60 
Far more important than the immediate dislocations and anti-democratic measures 
taken by the regime in the aftermath of the treaty are the larger political and demo- 
graphic consequences that the treaty may unleash-repercussions that may well be 
too much for such a fragile democratic transition to survive. Those consequences re- 
volve, in part, around the complex relationship between the Islamist movement and 
Jordan's large Palestinian population. While the Muslim Brotherhood and Islamic 
Action Front in Jordan have a number of social bases, they draw a disproportionate 
percentage (in comparison with other Jordanian political groupings) of their member- 
ship from Palestinians. Moreover, membership rosters aside, Islamists have garnered 
strong general support from Palestinian quarters, as the 1993 elections demonstrated. 
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As in the West Bank and Gaza, in Jordan Islamism has been the dominant vehicle of 
opposition to the post-Madrid Conference reconciliation between Israel and the Arab 
world, and it has continued to be so over the terms of the peace settlement with 
Israel. It seems likely, therefore, that the number of Palestinian Islamists in Jordan 
(and elsewhere) will increase in the coming few years-and that their politics will 
sharpen, particularly if the situation in Palestine continues to deteriorate. 
This trend will be further strengthened by the greatly enhanced volatility of Pal- 
estinian identity in Jordan in the post-peace period. In the coming years, Palestinians 
in Jordan will be forced to choose in some significant ways between being "Jorda- 
nian" and "Palestinian." Such a choice is fraught with political, not to mention psy- 
chological, peril for Palestinians in Jordan. To choose a fundamentally Palestinian 
identity will be to lose certain rights in Jordan; to choose a fundamentally Jordanian 
identity will be to relinquish both national claims to Palestine and concomitant 
political activity. Only an Islamist political identity can overcome such a draconian 
choice: a Palestinian Islamist can maintain an authentic concern for Palestine (al- 
though expressed in more Islamic and not national symbols) while maintaining a 
legitimate political standing in Jordan. 
For these reasons, unless peace brings near-utopian benefits, a significant strength- 
ening of the Islamist movement in Jordan in the next decade should be anticipated. 
Does the Jordanian state have the capacity to manage such an event through its 
defensive-democratization strategy? The answer is not at all clear. Does the Jorda- 
nian state have the capacity to contain a more powerful Islamist movement while 
deepening the democratic transition? The answer to this question is almost certainly 
no. Ironically, instead of heralding a brighter future, the end of the Arab-Israeli con- 
flict could have profoundly negative repercussions for domestic Jordanian politics, 
ushering in a new era of authoritarianism and ending the prospects for a successful 
transition to democracy in an Arab country. 
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